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#2A-9/23/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NO. U-12182 
-and-
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF 
TAXATION & FINANCE), 
Respondent. 
KURT MINERSAGEN, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Public Employees Federation (PEF) has filed exceptions 
to the dismissal by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director) of its charge against the State of 
New York (Department of Taxation & Finance) (State). 
The Director dismissed the charge, which alleges a violation 
of §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act 
(Act), upon his initial review pursuant to §204.2 of the Rules of 
Procedure. The Director concluded that PEF alleged a breach of 
contract not within our jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the Act. 
For the reasons which follow, we affirm the Director's 
decision. 
The charge complains about certain unilateral changes in a 
"Work Week Adjustment Program" under which employees are given 
credit for weekends spent in travel status. The charge alleges 
that this program was established pursuant to negotiations 
> 
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between the parties and the program is characterized in the 
charge as a negotiated benefit. 
In its exceptions, PEF argues that the charge is within our 
jurisdiction because the program is not a part of the parties1 
collective bargaining agreement. 
The jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act runs 
to a violation of an agreement between an employer and union. An 
agreement under the Act is simply the product of a mutual 
exchange of promises between the parties to a negotiating 
relationship.-^/ Section 205.5(d) of the Act provides, in 
relevant part, that the Board: 
[S]hall not exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
) violation of such an agreement that would not otherwise 
constitute an improper employer or employee 
organization practice. 
The jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) embraces any agreement 
as defined without regard to form or content. A claimed breach 
of an oral agreement-2-/ or an agreement ancillary to the 
parties' main contract-^ lies as much beyond our jurisdiction 
as a violation of the written collective bargaining agreement. 
It is, therefore, immaterial to the jurisdictional inquiry that 
-i/Act §201.12. 
•^The Act itself in §204.3 requires a written contract only 
on demand. 
^See Windsor Cent. School Dist., 13 PERB J3103 (1980) 
(alleged violation of grievance settlement dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction) . Accord County of Suffolk, 22 PERB [^3033 (1989) . 
See also Warsaw Cent. School Dist. , 23 PERB [^3022 (1990) (alleged 
j breach of memorandum of understanding regarding hours of work 
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction). 
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the program in issue is not a part of the parties' main contract. 
As the charge pleads that the program was established under and 
as a result of an exchange of promises, it necessarily lies 
beyond our power to entertain. 
For the reasons set forth above, PEF's exceptions are 
dismissed and the Director's decision is affirmed. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
DATED: September 23, 1991 
Albany, New York 
m 
« * Pauline R. Kinselia, Chairperson 
£u A4*JC*4*t* r Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
EricyJ. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BUFFALO TEACHERS FEDERATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11980 
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT D. CLEARFIELD and ROBERT KLINGENSMITH, ESQS., 
for Charging Party 
HODGSON, RUSS, ANDREWS, WOODS & GOODYEAR (KARL W. 
KRISTOFF and ELENA CACAVAS of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Board of 
Education of the City School District of the City of Buffalo 
(District) and cross-exceptions filed by the Buffalo Teachers 
Federation (BTF) to an interim decision-^/ of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
rendered after a hearing. 
As relevant to the issues before us, the Director held that 
the District waived its reserved right to ratify a tentative 
agreement, reached on September 1, 1990 between representatives 
of the BTF and Albert Thompson, Superintendent of Schools, 
-i/with the parties' agreement, the Director heard and 
decided only one of the two pleaded causes of action. 
! 
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because Thompson and Joseph Carney, the District's Director of 
Employee Relations, undermined that agreement^/ during their 
meetings with members of the Board of Education. In remedy, the 
Director ordered the District to execute, upon BTF's demand, a 
document embodying the agreements reached in negotiations. 
The District ascribes the following errors to the Director 
in its exceptions: 
1. His denial before hearing of the 
District's motion to dismiss the charge 
for failure to state a prima facie case; 
2. His denial during the hearing of the District's 
motion in limine-^/ to preclude the introduction 
of certain evidence by BTF; 
3. His failure to rule on the District's motion to 
dismiss at the close of the BTF's direct case; 
4. His failure to consider evidence bearing upon 
certain of the District's affirmative defenses; 
5. His substantive findings of violation and the 
remedial order issued pursuant thereto. 
BTF's cross-exceptions relate to the Director's remedy. BTF 
argues that the Board of Education's right and duty to 
legislatively approve certain terms of the tentative agreement 
pursuant to §201.12 and §204-a of the Act should also be held 
waived or that we should find that the necessary legislative 
^See, e.g., City of Saratoga Springs, 20 PERB ^3031 (1987). 
Reaffirming earlier decisions, we there stated that negotiators 
for each side have an affirmative duty to present the agreement 
to their ratifying entity and to support its approval. 
^A motion in limine seeks a ruling on the admissibility of 
evidence. 
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approval has already been given. Although somewhat unclear, BTF 
apparently seeks an order requiring the District to implement the 
terms of the tentative agreement on the theory that it is a 
binding contract in all respects. 
We turn first to the several procedural errors attributed to 
the Director by the District. 
A prehearing motion to dismiss for failure to set forth a 
prima facie case is properly granted only if the facts alleged 
cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a violation of the Act 
under any recognized or acceptable legal theory.4-/ In deciding 
such a motion, the charging party is entitled to all reasonable 
inferences and a presumption of the truth regarding the matters 
asserted.-^/ BTF alleges in its charge that members of the 
District's negotiating team violated their statutory duty to 
support ratification of the agreement and cites certain 
statements and actions in support of that allegation. As the 
allegations, if proven, could support a violation of the Act, we 
affirm the Director's decision to deny the District's prehearing 
motion to dismiss. 
The Director also denied the District's motion to preclude 
the introduction of any evidence regarding discussions which 
occurred during any executive session of the Board of Education 
•^/see Rules of Procedure §204.2; State of New York (Office 
of Mental Health) , 24 PERB J[3004 (1991) • 
^/citv of Yonkers, 23 PERB ^3055 (1990) . 
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or any evidence obtained ex parte by BTF's attorneys in violation 
of Disciplinary Rule (DR) 7-104(A)(1) of the Code of Professional 
Responsibility (CPR). 
The District would have us preclude the introduction of any 
evidence regarding any discussions about collective negotiations 
which occurred during an executive session of a board of 
education to further the public policy underlying the State's 
Open Meetings Law.-^/ The Open Meetings Law authorizes, but 
does not require, a public body to hold an executive session to 
discuss collective negotiations.-^/ The District argues that 
there is a need for robust debate during these sessions which 
will be threatened if the conversations are not privileged. 
The State Administrative Procedure Act permits the 
introduction of material and relevant evidence at an adjudicatory 
proceeding unless a recognized privilege attaches to the evidence 
sought to be introduced.-8-/ Our Rules of Procedure are to the 
same effect.-2/ There is no recognized privilege which attaches 
to all statements made during an executive session conducted by a 
^/N.Y. Pub. Off. Law, Art. 7, §§100-111 (McKinney 1988). 
2/N.Y. Pub. Off. Law, §105(1)(e) (McKinney 1988). 
Estate Admin. Proc. Act, §306 (McKinney 1984). 
^/Rules, §204.7(h). 
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public body and the statutory authorization to hold such a 
• in/ 
session cannot create one.^^ 
The District also argues that the Director's denial of its 
motion in limine undercuts the public policy of General Municipal 
Law §805-a(l)(b) which prohibits a municipal officer from 
disclosing confidential information acquired during the course of 
the officer's official duties. Our preceding discussion of 
evidentiary privilege applies equally to this particular 
argument. Moreover, we are unaware of any rule of law which 
makes all conversations during an executive session confidential 
within the meaning of the General Municipal Law, and, therefore, 
its provisions are not applicable. 
With respect to the first aspect of its motion in limine, 
the District argues lastly that the Director's ruling encourages 
±yj In Cirale v. 80 Pine St. Corp., 35 N.Y.2d 113 (1974), 
the Court of Appeals recognized a common-law official information 
privilege which protects from disclosure certain confidential 
communications between or to public officers. The Court later, 
however, in Doolan v. BOCES, 48 N.Y.2d 341 (1980), indicated that 
the privilege has since been superseded by the State's Freedom of 
Information Law which the Court stated fixed "the public policy 
concerning governmental disclosure. . . . " The privilege, to 
whatever extent it remains viable in New York, is generally 
applicable only where the public interest protected outweighs the 
public interest which would be served by disclosure in the 
particular case. Fisch, New York Evidence, §741 at 438 (2d ed. 
1977 & 1990-91 Supp.). We are not persuaded that the balance of 
competing interests favors nondisclosure of all communications 
during executive sessions of a public body when those 
communications often constitute the claimed impropriety or are 
the sole or major proof of the impropriety in this type of case. 
In view of this determination, we need not decide whether the 
record could support a violation if there were no consideration 
given to any of the statements made during the Board of 
Education's executive sessions. 
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unions to file nonmeritorious charges only to ascertain the 
employer's "bottom line" for negotiations. In rejecting this 
argument, we need note only that it is not the circumstance in 
this particular case. We consider the District's suggestion to 
be, at most, a remote possibility which can be adequately 
addressed under our existing rules without having to adopt the 
broad exclusionary rule advocated by the District. 
As noted, the second aspect of the District's motion in 
limine involves DR 7-104(A)(1) of the CPR. The CPR is 
essentially the legal profession's self-government document, 
embodying principles of ethical conduct for attorneys as well as 
rules for professional discipline. DR 7-104(A)(1) prohibits an 
attorney from communicating directly with a party known to have 
counsel in a matter unless the attorney has the prior consent of 
the party's counsel or is authorized by law to communicate with 
the party. 
The District alleges in support of this aspect of its motion 
that counsel for BTF twice talked with Judith Fisher, President 
of the District's Board of Education, who later was subpoenaed by 
BTF and testified as a witness on its behalf. 
We do not consider it our right or responsibility to enforce 
the CPR in the context of our proceedings. To ensure consistency 
in approach, enforcement of an attorney's ethical responsibilities 
is best left to the professional bodies and the judicial system 
charged with that specific duty. Moreover, were we to undertake 
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any responsibility for the enforcement of an attorney's 
professional ethics, the disposition of the statutory issues which 
are exclusively or properly within our jurisdiction would be 
delayed, a result we consider to be plainly inconsistent with the 
specific policies of the Act and administrative adjudication in 
general. Our approach to this issue is particularly appropriate 
when, as here, the alleged violation of the disciplinary rule is 
unrelated to the credibility of the witness or the trustworthiness 
of other evidence. 
Although the District relies upon the Court of Appeals' 
recent decision in Niesicr v. Team 1 (Niesiq)
 /ii/ that decision 
does not require or warrant a change in our approach to the 
enforcement of ethical standards of professional practice. Niesiq 
did not involve an attempt to use the disciplinary rule as the 
basis for an evidentiary privilege. In Niesiq, plaintiff's 
attorney in a personal injury case sought the courts' permission 
to interview privately a corporate defendant's employees who had 
witnessed the accident in issue. The question presented, 
therefore, was whether the interview was prohibited and the Court 
was careful to specifically limit its decision to that particular 
issue under the facts of that case.-^^/ With that admonition in 
mind, and given our other concerns, we are unwilling to use Niesiq 
-^76 N.Y.2d 363 (1990) 
•i^ /76 N.Y.2d at 376. 
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as the basis for the creation of an exclusionary rule for 
application in the context of administrative adjudication. 
For these reasons, we affirm the Director's ruling denying 
the District's motion in limine in its entirety. We do not, 
therefore, make any findings as to whether DR 7-104(A)(1) was 
violated by BTF's counsel on the facts in this record. 
The District's motion to dismiss at the close of BTF's direct 
case was necessarily denied by the Director, albeit without a 
specific ruling, and we consider the District's exception in that 
context. 
The disposition of this particular motion is governed by 
standards similar to those which apply to prehearing motions to 
dismiss for failure to set forth a prima facie case.-^/ Having 
reviewed the record on BTF's direct case, we cannot conclude that 
the evidence, read in the light most favorable to BTF, is plainly 
insufficient to establish any violation of the Act. Therefore, 
the District's motion in this respect was properly denied by the 
Director. 
The District also argues that the Director's decision during 
the hearing to reserve decision on its motion to dismiss at the 
close of BTF's direct case constituted a procedural error which 
affected the outcome of the case. 
The Director's decision to reserve decision on the motion was 
a matter for his discretion. We find no abuse in the exercise of 
^ S e e , e.g. , County of Nassau, 17 PERB [^3013 (1984) . 
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this discretion which reflected the Director's recognition of the 
limited circumstances which we have said will justify the granting 
of such a dispositive motion. 
The District next argues that the Director refused to permit 
it to introduce evidence regarding certain of the District's 
affirmative defenses which centered upon allegations that the BTF 
had made strike threats before the ratification vote and had 
submitted nonmandatory subjects of bargaining to impasse. 
Preliminarily, we note that there is a wealth of evidence in 
the record regarding BTF•s strike threats, so much that any 
additional evidence in that respect might well be regarded as 
unduly repetitious.^J We dismiss that part of this exception 
for that reason alone. Moreover, we agree with the Director's 
observation that evidence which is otherwise properly excluded 
does not necessarily become admissible just because it bears upon 
an affirmative defense. Neither the BTF's alleged strike threats 
nor its alleged refusal to bargain would have permitted the 
District's negotiators to violate their independent duty to 
support the tentative agreement.-^/ As the Director's decision 
to either minimize or exclude evidence related to the District's 
affirmative defenses was not reversible error, we also dismiss 
this exception. 
•^/such evidence is properly excluded. N.Y. Admin. Proc. 
Act, §306 (McKinney 1984). 
•iVsee, e.g. , Bath Cent. School Dist. , 23 PERB 53026 (1990) ; 
City of Schenectady, 21 PERB [^3022 (1988) . 
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The District's next exceptions relate to the Director's 
substantive findings regarding the propriety of Thompson's and 
Carney's statements and conduct concerning ratification of the 
tentative agreement. 
The Director held that Thompson violated his duty as a 
negotiator of the tentative contract when he "allowed, 
participated and substantively contributed to a discussion about 
possible alternative negotiating positions" before the Board of 
Education had decided whether to accept or reject the tentative 
agreement. 
We are not persuaded, however, that Thompson's statements or 
actions at the September 2 6 executive session of the Board of 
Education show that he did not fully and affirmatively support the 
tentative agreement, and his conduct at other times is not 
suspect. All of Thompson's statements at that particular meeting 
were made in response to specific inquiries from members of the 
Board of Education and were in the form of possible alternatives 
to the tentative contract if the Board of Education were to reject 
the tentative contract. Unlike the Director, we do not consider 
Thompson's answers to the Board of Education members' questions 
and a discussion of options under a suggested hypothesis to have 
been inconsistent with his affirmative support for the tentative 
agreement he negotiated. For these reasons, we reverse that part 
of the Director's decision which finds Thompson's statements or 
conduct on September 2 6 to have been improper and grant such of 
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the District's exceptions as are directed to that part of the 
Director's decision. 
The Director also held that Carney failed to carry out his 
duties as a negotiator by preparing and distributing to Board of 
Education members David Kelly and Frank Jager a four-page writing 
which articulated a rationale in opposition to the tentative 
contract and in favor of a one-year contract. The Director 
concluded that this writing was both intended to undermine support 
for the tentative contract and likely caused that result. 
We have scrutinized the record with respect to the Director's 
findings in this respect and, having done so, we conclude that the 
record fully supports his findings regarding the propriety of 
Carney's conduct, which rest substantially upon the Director's 
assessment of Carney's credibility drawn from his observations of 
Carney's demeanor as a witness.-^/ 
Turning to BTF's exceptions as we understand them, BTF seeks 
an order which would require the District to implement the 
tentative agreement on a theory that any right or duty of the 
Board of Education under §201.12 and §204-a.l of the Act to 
approve certain terms of that tentative agreement has been waived. 
16/We have generally accorded great weight to credibility 
determinations made by the trier of fact. See, e.g., Monticello 
Cent. School Dist. , 22 PERB [^3002 (1989) . 
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BTF's arguments in support of this exception fail to make the 
necessary distinction between ratification and legislative 
approval and ignore our jurisdictional limitations. There is no 
statutory right or duty to ratify a tentative collective 
bargaining agreement. The right to ratify stems from the 
negotiators' reservation of that right as a condition precedent to 
the statutory duty to execute the contract on demand. Here, 
therefore, the right to ratify did not belong to the District's 
Board of Education. The right to ratify, having been created by 
the negotiators, can be waived by the negotiators* conduct if it 
falls below the minimum we have mandated. If the negotiators' 
conduct is improper, they lose any right to have the third party 
ratify their actions and the negotiators' duty to execute the 
agreement they have reached becomes fixed upon tender of a 
document which accurately embodies the parties * agreements reached 
during negotiations. 
The right and duty of a legislative body of a public employer 
to approve legislatively certain terms of an agreement arises by 
statute and exists independently from any action by the 
negotiators, who represent the executive branch of government 
within which the right and duty to bargain is lodged. Unlike 
ratification, however, legislative approval is required only for 
certain terms of an agreement. Moreover, legislative approval is 
a right that belongs to the legislative body, not to the 
negotiators. 
• ^ 
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With these distinctions in mind, it should be apparent that 
any remedial order, other than the one entered by the Director, 
would necessarily require the specific performance of the terms of 
what BTF considers to be a binding contract. We are not empowered 
to grant such an order under §2 05.5(d) of the Act. Whether the 
Board of Education can and did waive its right and duty to 
legislatively approve certain terms of the tentative agreement or 
whether it preapproved that tentative agreement are not issues for 
our determination in the context of an improper practice charge 
because those issues are only relevant to the enforceability of 
the September 1 agreements.^-f For purposes of the issues 
raised in this case, the District satisfies the entirety of its 
statutory obligation by signing a document embodying the terms of 
the September 1 tentative agreements. 
BTF relies upon our decision in Sylvan-Verona Beach.^-f 
In Sylvan-Verona Beach, we ordered only the execution of a 
contract in circumstances in which members of the legislative body 
served as the negotiators for the contract. Sylvan-Verona Beach 
merely stands for the proposition that legislative disapproval is 
not a viable defense to a charge alleging a refusal to execute a 
document embodying the agreements reached during 
•i-^ /see Watkins Glen Cent. School Dist.
 r 23 PERB ^3035 
(1990). 
i £ / l 5 PERB ||[3067 (1982) . 
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negotiations.i2/ Thus, nothing we said in that case is contrary 
to our determination that the issues BTF raises in conjunction 
with the legislative approval of the tentative contract are not 
within our jurisdiction.-2-0-/ 
For the reasons set forth above, we dismiss the District's 
and BTF's exceptions and we affirm the Director's decision,^/ 
except insofar as the decision and exceptions concern the 
impropriety of Thompson's conduct and statements at the meeting of 
the Board of Education on September 26, 1990, in which respect the 
Director's decision is reversed and the District's exceptions are 
granted. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED^/ that the District execute, 
upon BTF's demand, a document embodying the agreements reached by 
the parties on September 1, 199 0, and that it sign and post the 
1 q / , , 
±2JAccord Watkms Glen Cent. School Dist. , supra note 17. 
^°-/Accord Harpursville Cent. School Dist. , 14 PERB ^3003 
(1980). 
^=/The Director held that the District violated both §209-
a.l(a) and (d) of the Act. The District has not filed exceptions 
directed specifically to the Director's finding that its conduct 
violated subparagraph (a) and, therefore, we do not reach that 
issue. By our affirmance of the Director's decision, however, we 
make no holding that a negotiator's failure to support a 
tentative contract constitutes a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act. That particular issue is simply not before us. 
2
-
2
-/The District excepts to the remedial relief ordered by 
the Director, but does so only on the ground that his finding of 
a violation of the Act is erroneous. Having affirmed the 
Director's finding of a violation, we also adopt his recommended 
remedial order. 
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attached notice at all locations ordinarily used to post notices 
of information to employees in BTF's unit. 
DATED: September 23, 1991 
Albany, New York 
1L\ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
UuUtz*?* 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Meia 
Eric/u. Schmertz, Membe 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Buffalo 
Teachers Federation (BTF) that the City School District of the 
City of Buffalo: 
Will execute, upon BTF's request, a document 
embodying the agreements reached by the parties 
on September 1, 1990. 
THE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
OF THE CITY OF BUFFALO 
Dated By. • • • • 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - Case No. U-11728 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF MENTAL 
HEALTH), 
Respondent. 
JOHN RYAN, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, ESQ. (RICHARD W. McDOWELL of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public 
Employees Federation, AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by the Director 
of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). 
The Director dismissed PEF's charge against the State of New York 
(Office of Mental Health) (OMH or State) which alleges that the 
State violated §209-a.l(a), (b) and (c) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it laid off, among others in the 
administrative analyst title series, PEF officers, activists and 
members in retaliation for PEF's public opposition to an earlier 
layoff plan proposed by OMH's Commissioner. 
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The Director dismissed PEF's charge on findings that the 
State's decisions were properly motivated by budgetary and other 
business considerations. 
PEF alleges in its exceptions that the Director's summary of 
the facts was inaccurate in certain respects, but otherwise, it 
simply realleges that the State selected the administrative 
analyst title series for layoffs in order to reach the PEF 
officers, members and activists. 
The State argues in response that the Director's decision 
was accurate in all material respects and was correct in its 
conclusion. 
Budget reductions at OMH required a staffing reduction of 84 
positions from OMH's central office. The layoffs affected the 
entire central office, including commissioners, provisional and 
temporary employees, and permanent employees, including 21 
employees in PEF's unit, 13 of whom were in the administrative 
analyst series. Four of the administrative analysts who were 
laid off were PEF activists, but the record shows that only one 
of them was known to OMH's administrative staff to be a PEF 
activist. 
Although four persons in the administrative analyst series, 
who were not PEF officers or activists, were not laid off, we do 
not consider that fact to be dispositive in PEF's favor. As the 
Director noted in his decision, the scope of the layoffs affected 
many more employees than just PEF members, officers or activists. 
Whatever minor inaccuracies may exist in the Director's summary 
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of the material facts do not affect his decision. Having 
reviewed the record, we are not presented with any reason to 
disagree with the Director's credibility findings that OMH 
selected the administrative analyst title series and laid off or 
retained persons within that title series without regard to any 
individual or organizational exercise of rights protected by the 
KctM 
For the reasons set forth above, we deny PEF's exceptions 
and affirm the Director's decision. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed. 
DATED: September 23, 1991 
Albany, New York 
do not decide whether the layoff of any particular 
individual complied with all other requirements of the Civil 
Service Law. 
/ / 2 D - 9 / 2 3 / 9 1 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, 
Charging Party, 
CASE NOS. U-113 60 
-and- & U-11362 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF 
PORT JERVIS and PORT JERVIS TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION, 
Respondents. 
JOHN THOMAS McANDREW, pro se 
HENRY J. HOLLEY, ESQ., for Respondent City School 
District of the City of Port Jervis 
KENNETH WILDER, for Respondent Port Jervis Teachers 
Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on the exceptions of John Thomas 
McAndrew to an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision denying 
any remedial relief despite her finding that the City School 
District of the City of Port Jervis (District) and the Port 
Jervis Teachers Association (Association) violated, respectively, 
§209-a.l(a) and §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). The violations were premised upon the 
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District's and the Association's agreement to Article 
XVIII.(B)^/ in their 1989-92 labor contract which restricted 
unit employees' rights to file and prosecute certain improper 
practice charges. The ALT did not order any remedial relief 
because the District and the Association rescinded the clause 
shortly after the charges were filed without having previously 
applied it to McAndrew or other unit employees. 
McAndrew requests reimbursement for the costs and legal 
expenses he incurred in prosecuting his charges and that the 
District and Association be ordered to post an appropriate 
notice. The District and Association urge us to affirm the AKT's 
declination to order any remedial relief. 
An order requiring the respondents to pay any of the 
expenses McAndrew incurred in the prosecution of his improper 
practice charges, if any, is not warranted because there are not 
•i/The provision reads as follows: 
ARTICLE XVIII. LEGAL LEAVES OF ABSENCE 
B. When the proceeding is initiated by a 
member of the Port Jervis Teachers Association and 
is a [sic] improper practice, arbitration, or 
other labor related hearing any subpoena to a 
member of the Port Jervis Staff, shall be by court 
order or order of the hearing officer, after 
notice of application for the same and a hearing 
on the propriety thereof in order not to interfere 
with the attendance of staff to their regular 
duties and obligations. 
Board - U-11360 & U-11362 -3 
any unusual circumstances present which might justify such an 
order.2J it is the Board's policy, however, to order a posting 
of notice in all cases in which a violation of the Act has been 
found unless there is contrary good cause shown.^ The purpose 
of the posting requirement is to help ensure that all unit 
employees have knowledge of their rights and others' obligations. 
We believe that a limited posting-^/ is appropriate in this case 
because despite the subsequent rescission of Article XVIII(B), we 
are not assured on this record that all unit employees know that 
the clause is not in effect. 
For the reasons set forth above, we grant the exceptions 
which pertain to the notice posting, modify the ALJ's decision to 
that extent, and order both the District and Association to each 
sign and post notice in the form attached wherever either 
ordinarily posts informational notices to unit employees. In all 
^United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, 16 PERB 53052 
(1983) (costs) ; Westbury Teachers Ass'n, 14 PERB 53063 (1981) 
(attorneys' fees). 
^/see, e.g., City University of New York, 23 PERB 53011 
(1990). 
notice stating that the respondents will not interfere 
with, restrain or coerce unit employees in the exercise of their 
rights under the Act is neither necessary nor appropriate under 
the circumstances of these cases. 
Board - U-11360 & U-11362 
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other respects, the exceptions are dismissed and the ALJ's order 
is affirmed. 
DATED: September 23, 1991 
Albany, New York 
7<iAv* ^--hv^JU 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Me»be er 
Eric JV Schmertz, Member 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 al]_ e m p l o y e e s o f t h e Cj[ty school District of the 
City of Port Jervis (District) in the unit represented by the 
Port Jervis Teachers Association (Association), pursuant to a 
finding by the Public Employment Relations Board that the 
District violated §209-a.l(a) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and that the Association violated §209-a.2(a) of 
the Act, that Article XVIII.(B) of the 1989-92 contract between 
the District and the Association has been rescinded. 
Dated By 
CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF 
THE CITY OF PORT JERVIS 
o o » o c « o » o « o o o o » o o o o o o o o o e o o « o o 
( R e p r e s e n t a t i v e ) ( T i t l e ) 
P.ORT. .JERVIS -TEACHERS •ASSNv • • 
Dated By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
//2E-9/23/91 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION, LOCAL 1056, 
AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-10810 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Respondent. 
GLADSTEIN, REIF & MEGINNISS (WALTER M. MEGINNISS, JR. 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
ALBERT C. COSENZA, ESQ. (GEORGE S. GRUPSMITH of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION 
By motion dated August 9, 1991, the New York City Transit 
Authority (Authority) requests that we reconsider or clarify our 
decision and order in this case dated July 10, 19 91.-1/ The 
request for reconsideration is based upon the alleged 
untimeliness of the charge and the alleged burdens placed upon 
the Authority under our order regarding the identification of 
unit employees who may be eligible for remedial relief. The 
identification of the specific employees who may be covered by 
the remedial order is also the basis for the clarification 
request. 
The motion is opposed by the Amalgamated Transit Union, 
Local 1056, AFL-CIO. 
^ 2 4 PERB fl3013 (1991) . 
U-10810 - Board 
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The Authority has appealed our July 10, 1991 decision and 
order pursuant to CPLR Article 78 and Civil Service Law §213. 
Our decision is sufficiently clear and should the order be 
enforced on appeal, any questions associated with the remedy can 
be addressed in the context of a compliance review. The few 
circumstances which favor the grant of motions similar to the 
Authority's are not present in this case.-2-/ 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the motion be, and it hereby 
is, denied in its entirety. 
DATED: September 23, 1991 
Albany, New York 
M I M . h- JLXAOJ U 
Paluline Kinsel la , Chairperson 
Walte Eisenberg, Membe 
^See Town of Brookhaven, 19 PERB [^3 010 (198 6) ; City of 
Auburn, 10 PERB f3060 (1977); Binghamton Fire Fighters, Local 
729., 9 PERB ^3078 (1976) . 
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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
HERKIMER COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE 
FACULTY ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3811 
HERKIMER COUNTY COMMUNITY COLLEGE and 
HERKIMER COUNTY, 
Joint Employer, 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY, CERTIFIED that the Herkimer County Community 
College Faculty Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All full-time teaching and nonteaching faculty, 
Technical Assistants, Public Relations 
Coordinator, Coordinator of Radio/TV, Play and 
Learn Center (Assistant Director), Director of 
Business Assistance, Director of Credit Free 
Programs, Financial Aid Technical Assistant, 
and Learning Center Specialist. 
Certification - C-3811 
- 2 -
Excluded: President, Dean of the College, Dean of 
Students, Dean of Administration, Division 
Chairpersons, Director of Admissions, Director 
of Community Education, Director of Personnel, 
Assistant to the President, Director of 
Institutional Research, Director of Financial 
Aid, Director of Athletics, Controller, 
Director of Library Services, Bursar, 
Purchasing Agent, Director of Physical Plant, 
Facilities Program Coordinator, Systems 
Administrator, Director of Learning Center, 
Accountant and Assistant Director of 
Admissions. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Herkimer County Community 
College Faculty Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 23, 1991 
Albany, New York 
^ H | \ ^ jC* S\r\<tf/f(&, 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
/ . - - . 
•an4rf\U t t 4 ^ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
FRANKLIN COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3847 
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN and FRANKLIN COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Joint Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees1 Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees* Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Franklin County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Sheriff's Department employees, 
Excluded: Sheriff and Undersheriff. 
Certification - C-3847 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Franklin County Deputy 
Sheriff's Association. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: September 23, 1991 
Albany, New York 
ie R. Kinsella, Chai rperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
